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HEADS, SECULARISTS WIN; TAILS, BELIEVERS
LOSE-RETURNING ONLY FREE EXERCISE TO THE POLITICAL
PROCESS
Teresa Stanton Collett
Military officials attempting to censor chaplains' sermons;' these same
officials insisting that the children of service personnel be cared for in a
religiously-sterile environment;2 Jewish officers forbidden to wear yarmulkes
while in uniform; 3 Christian landlords forced to accept tenants the landlords
believe to be engaged in sinful conduct;4 Catholic lawyers threatened with
professional discipline if they decline to represent young girls seeking
abortions;5 religiously-affiliated hospitals threatened with judicially-imposed
access to their facilities for the performance of abortions; 6 each of these actions
contributes to a sense of alienation by citizens who believe that true freedom
is threatened by the growing power of the state, and its indifference to claims
of superior duties to God Each is the product of government officials seeking
a "good" that they define as superior to the good of respecting religious beliefs.
Within this weighing of goods is a distorted claim of neutrality toward religion
that ignores the incommensurate nature of the competing goods. Lived reality
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am grateful to Dean Rod Smith and
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal for the invitation to participate in this
symposium. Professors Gerald Bradley, Catherine Burnett, Richard Duncan, and Paul McGreal
acted as sounding boards for many of the ideas in this article, and Elisa Ugarte also provided
helpful criticism of earlier drafts.
1. See Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997) (overturning order precluding
military chaplains from encouraging members of their congregation to urge Congress to
override the presidential veto of the Partial-Birth Abortion Bill).
2. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995) (overturning military regulations
prohibiting on-base family child care providers from engaging in religious practices during day
care).
3. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military regulation forbidding the
wearing of head covering indoors held constitutional due to military's claim of necessity).
Congress responded by enacting 10 U.S.C. § 774 permitting the wearing of "neat and
conservative" religious apparel while in uniform. These events are critically evaluated in
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-off Approach to Questions of
Religious PracticeandBelief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997).
4. See Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989), but
see Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (holding that landlord's refusal to rent to
unmarried, cohabiting couple was protected by the Free Exercise protections in the Minnesota
Constitution).
5. See Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-F-140 (1996).
6. See Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. MAT-SU Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 971 n. 18
(Alaska 1997).
7. See Symposium, The End of Democracy, The Judicial Usurpationof Politics, 67
FIRST THINGS 18 (Nov. 1996); JAMEs DAvIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICIA (1991); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
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teaches that religious objections differ from objections grounded in claims of
convenience, cost, or even self-concept.8
This distorted understanding of neutrality achieved its ultimate legal
standing when the United States Supreme Court rendered its ruling in
Employment Division v. Smith, declaring that "the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability."' 9 Responding to wide-spread disapproval of this
ruling, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).' 0 RFRA affirmed the unique nature of claims grounded in religious
beliefs, and required that laws substantially burdening religious practices be
justified as serving a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means." The United States Supreme Court responded by declaring RFRA
unconstitutional as to state and local laws in Boerne v. Flores.2 This result
does little to reconcile those citizens who have begun to wonder whether "we
have reached or are reaching the point where conscientious citizens can no
longer give moral assent to the existing regime.""
This article describes three recent refusals by government officials to
accommodate religious believers by applying explicit exemptions to general
obligations. These refusals are a product of the Court's failure to clearly
identify the circumstances where accommodation of religious beliefs remains
constitutionally required by the Free Exercise Clause, and where such
accommodations violate the Establishment Clause. In examining these three
cases, I argue that some accommodations of religious beliefs remain constitu8. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
Compare this understanding of the human person with that described by Pope John Paul, II,
THE GOSPEL OF LIFE (Evangelium Vitae) (1995) at para. 74.
To refuse to take part in committing an injustice is not only a moral duty, it is
also a basic human right. Were this not so, the human person would be forced
to perform an action intrinsically incompatible with human dignity, and in this
way human freedom itself, the authentic meaning and purpose of which is
found in its orientation to the true and the good, would be radically
compromised. What is at stake therefore is an essential right which, precisely
as such, should be acknowledged and protected by civil law.
Id.
9. 494 U.S. 872 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb4 (1994).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3.
12. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
13. Symposium, The End of Democracy, The Judicial Usurpationof Politics, 67 FIRST
THINGS 18, 19 (Nov. 1996). See also JAMEs DAvIDsON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).

1998]

FREE EXERCISE

tionally required and that such accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Absent an adequate understanding of the post-Smith duty of accommodation, government officials will continue to exclude religious believers from
generally available benefits, 4 and reject reasonable requests for exemptions
from generally-applicable law. 5 Having limited judicial protection of religious
beliefs in Smith, the Court's rejection of RFRA in Boerne may be misinterpreted as establishing the proposition that political protections of religious
practices are constitutionally suspect. While the limitations of federalism may
have left the Court no alternative to striking down RFRA in Boerne, the
Court's refusal to reevaluate or clarify Smith sends the signal to all government
officials that protection of religious practices is disfavored and will be tolerated
only when, and if, the courts say so. This is not the law embodied in the First
16
Amendment, and it is not the law found in the Court's own jurisprudence.
But it will be the law officials govern their conduct by, absent a clear statement
from the Court that accommodation of religious beliefs is sometimes required,
and usually permissible.
I. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

In Boerne, RFRA 7 was declared unconstitutional as an intrusion into the
states' retained power to regulate the conduct of their citizens,"8 and the Court's
authority to interpret the Constitution.' While acknowledging that RFRA was
14. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(state university unconstitutionally refused funding to student newspaper promoting religious
perspective for fear that funding would violate the Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1993) (attempting to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause school unconstitutionally refused use of building to religious
group for evening presentation).
15. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
17. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb4(1994).
18. 'This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." Boerne, 117 S.
Ct. at 2171.
19. See id. at 2172.
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that
in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect
due them under settled principles, including staredecisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such
as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are
beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must
control.
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passed in response to Congressional perception that the Court had reduced
protection of the free exercise of religion,20 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg, analyzed the case primarily as
presenting a question concerning the limits of Congressional power, rather than
the limits of the secular state.2
Justice Scalia joined in much of their analysis but also addressed the
question of religious liberty. He defended the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause in Smith as consistent with the original understanding of the
First Amendment.2 2 In Smith, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
as permitting religiously-neutral laws of general applicability
that have the
23
incidental effect of burdening religious beliefs and practices.
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer dissented in Boerne, arguing that
without briefing, argument, and full consideration of the Smith standard for
review of free exercise claims, the constitutionality of RFRA could not be
determined. 24 "If the Court were to correct the misinterpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause set forth in Smith, it would simultaneously put our First
Amendment jurisprudence back on course and allay the legitimate concerns of
a majority in Congress who believed that Smith improperly restricted religious
liberty. We would then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 25
When viewed in isolation, both Smith and Boerne appear to be the
products of a judicially conservative court, deeply respectful of the political
will of the people and the structural protections inherent in federalism. Writing
for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia observes:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a

Id. at 2172.

20. "Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)." Id. at 2160.
21. Seeid. at 2162-72.
22. See id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth
Amendment has been interpreted as requiring that the states observe this protection also. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.6-.8 (2d
ed. 1992).
24. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See id. at 2185 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.26
In Boerne, Justice Scalia reiterates his position that political protections
are to be preferred over judicial protections:
Who can possibly be against the abstract proposition that government
should not, even in its general, nondiscriminatory laws, place unreasonable
burdens upon religious practice? Unfortunately, however, that abstract
proposition must ultimately be reduced to concrete cases. The issue
presented in Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through their
elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome of
those concrete cases. For example, shall it be the determination of this
Court, or rather of the people, whether (as the dissent apparently believes)
church construction will be exempt from zoning laws? The historical
evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the
conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the people.27
The irony of judicially vetoing RFRA, an act that passed both houses of
Congress with only three negative votes,2" on the basis that "the people" and
"their elected representatives" should control the contours of religious liberty
could not have escaped Justice Scalia. To a social conservative, such rhetoric
about the Court's deep respect for the will of the people is only credible
because it is authored by Justice Scalia, a man whose voting record evidences
his opposition to what some scholars have characterized as "the judicial
usurpation of politics."29
Even accepting Justice Scalia's laudable intentions to return to the people
fundamental questions about the ordering of our lives together, and his vision
of limited federal intervention in the political affairs of each state, Smith 's
disregard of the text of the Constitution, and Boerne's rejection of the unified
national attempt to correct this disregard, give rise to three distinct harms to
religious liberty. First, Boerne suggests that any comprehensive effort at the
federal level to protect religious believers from undue burdening of their beliefs
is doomed to failure. 30 This leaves religious believers to the fragmentary
26. 494 U.S. at 890.

27. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. See 139 CONG. REc. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H2363 (daily
ed. May Ii, 1993).
29. See Symposium, The End ofDemocracy, The JudicialUsurpationof Politics, 67 FIRST
THINGS 18 (Nov. 1996).

30. For a more optimistic view of the possibilities of federal legislation in this area, see
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom after Boeme, 2 NEXUS 91 (1997) (suggesting that the
federal spending and commerce powers could be used to provide some statutory protection
against burdening of religious beliefs).
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process of reclaiming their liberty state by state, and federal statute by federal
statute.3' Second, as Scalia concedes in Smith, members of small religious
sects are likely to suffer significantly more burdens on their beliefs because of
nonparticipation or underrepresentation in the political process. 32 Finally, and
perhaps of greatest concern, efforts to obtain political accommodations for
religious believers will be substantially impeded by the current confusion in the
jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause.3
While political accommodations of religious beliefs remain both
constitutionally and pragmatically possible,34 many government officials
assume that Smith signaled the abolition of Free Exercise as a limiting principle
31. Time, energy, and resources previously available for worship, ministry, or social
justice initiatives must now be diverted to monitoring state and federal legislation to insure that
exemptions are sought when an otherwise desirable law will burden particular religious
practices. State RFRAs must be pursued, as well as litigation seeking more expansive
protections from state constitutional provisions. In short, Smith and its progeny Boerne seem
made to order for adamant separatists or secularists who recognize the value of "divide and
conquer."
32. As Justice Scalia regretfully noted in Smith, attempts to obtain legislative
accommodations of minority religions have little chance of political success. This is due in part
to the mere absence of numbers. Small sects often do not have the political muscle or acumen
to gain the ear of their elected representatives. Even when they gain the attention of their
lawmakers the religious practices they seek to protect may seem too foolish, strange, or even
frightening to appeal to the general citizenry. Under such circumstances, it will be difficult for
elected representatives to justify an exemption from a generally desirable law to the folks back
home.
Separate from the political limitations inherent in being a member of a small group in a
democracy, is the theological problem posed by requiring active intervention in the political
process in order to protect the right to serve God according to the believer's understanding of
the divine will. Many small religious groups eschew political activities as contrary to living a
Godly life. Surely this does not justify indifference on the part of the larger political
community, yet this result is reasonably predictable without the protections inherent in a more
vigorous interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
33. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in "hopeless disarray," Rosenberger,515 U.S.
at 861 (Thomas, J. concurring); and in need of "[s]ubstantial revision," County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
34. This is true, even for beliefs held by only a small group of believers. In response to
the Smith opinion, officials at the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)
announced there would no longer be a religious exemption to the requirement that hard hats be
worn on construction sites. No Exemption From Hard Hat Wear Based on High-Court
Decision, OSHA Says, 20 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1018 (Nov. 14, 1990) (discussing OSHA Notice
CPL 2, which requires construction workers to wear helmets, effectively barring turban-wearing
Sikhs from employment). Only sustained efforts by members of various religious communities
averted this precipitous action. See Religious Freedom RestorationAct of 1991: Hearings on
H.R.2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 122-23 (1992) (testimony of Rep. Solarz) (underscoring that
the OSHA initially reacted to Smith by rescinding an exemption for Old Order Amish and Sikhs
from the hard hat rule, a response that was averted only by a sustained outcry from the religious
community).

1998]

FREE EXERCISE

695

on any government actions, other than those motivated by religious animus."5
Under this assumption the Establishment Clause becomes the sole constitutional measure related to religion. This leads to the conclusion that accommodating religious beliefs is not constitutionally required, and may be constitutionally forbidden.3 6 So long as this factor of intimidation remains, the political
dialogue concerning the proper accommodation of religious beliefs that Justice
Scalia envisions will never exist. Instead, officials' evaluations of political
options will remain skewed against accommodation, and the trivialization of
religious beliefs will continue to plague this nation.37
H. MANDATORY ACCOMMODATIONS AFTER SMITH

In early 1992 Professor Michael McConnell summarized the state of the
law on accommodating religious beliefs:
The principal recent case interpreting the Free Exercise Clause is
Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court held that "an individ-

ual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."
The opinion suggests certain exceptions to the rule, which on their face
appear to be potentially expansive, but it seems probable that these
exceptions were mentioned for the purpose of distinguishing disfavored
precedents and will not survive to do serious work.38

The "potentially expansive" exceptions in Smith 39 referred to by Professor
McConnell include cases where the law is specifically directed at a religious
35. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520.
36. "Much governmental discrimination against religion is motivated by mistaken or
exaggerated interpretations of the Establishment Clause or the principle of separation between
church and state." Michael W. McConnell, Institutions andInterpretation: A Critiqueof City
ofBoerne v. Flores, 111 HARv.L. REV. 153 at n. 23 (1997). See. e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 819 (1995) (state university unconstitutionally refused funding to student newspaper
promoting religious perspective for fear that funding would violate the Establishment Clause);
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-97 (1993) (attempting to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause school unconstitutionally refused use of building to religious group for evening
presentation).
37. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
38. Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 696 (1992).
39. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth
Amendment has been interpreted as requiring that the states observe this protection also. See
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 21.6-.8 (2d ed. 1992).
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practice, 40 or the conduct is protected by the Free Exercise Clause and some
other constitutional provision,4' or the law contains individualized exemptions
42
which are not extended to cases of religious hardship.
In 1993, the Court established that Smith did not render the Free Exercise
Clause totally impotent by its ruling in Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc.

v. Hialeah.43 In Lukumi the Court struck down city ordinances prohibiting
animal sacrifice. Noting that laws may be facially neutral, yet aimed at "covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs,"" the Court looked beyond the text
of the ordinances to determine the "effect of [the] law in its real operation."4' 5
Because the ordinances permitted almost every other form of animal slaughter,
the ordinances appeared to be targeting the ritual sacrifice of animals by the
Santeria. Such targeting subjected the ordinances to strict scrutiny. The city
was unable to establish that the laws were narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, thus the ordinances were held unconstitutional.4 6
After Lukumi, under the Free Exercise Clause there appear to be four
circumstances in which a law creating incidental burdens on religious beliefs
will be subject to strict scrutiny. First, if the law is not generally applicable,
and burdens religious beliefs, the courts will require the state to show that the
law serves a compelling state interest. While dicta by the Court has occasionally equated this with a showing that the law was the product of religious
animus, 47 lower courts have adhered to the original requirement of general

applicability as articulated in Smith.48 Second, a law burdening multiple
fundamental rights, including free exercise rights, will give rise to a "hybrid"
40. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
41. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-880.
42. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708. See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520; Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (1990). Cf Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State
Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (free exercise clause not
violated by university curriculum that was generally applicable to all students, was not aimed
at particular religious practices, and did not contain system of particularized exemptions).
43. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id. at 535.
46. See id.

47. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 2226-27; Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
48. "Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)."' Id. at 1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3.)
Lower courts applying the general neutrality test include Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th
Cir. 1995) (Army may not prohibit on-base family child care providers from engaging in
religious practices during day care); and Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-53 (D.
Neb. 1996) (state university could not refuse to grant exemption to freshman seeking to live offcampus in a religious group house where such exemptions were granted to one-third of all
freshmen).
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claim of unconstitutionality, triggering strict scrutiny. Third, laws containing
systems of individualized exemptions cannot be enforced so as to exclude any
exemption for "religious hardship," without a showing of compelling state
interest. Finally, facially neutral laws may operate in such a manner that their
operation gives rise to an inference that the law targets a particular religious act
or belief. If the inference arises, the state must show that the law serves a
compelling state interest. Each of these possibilities forms the basis for a claim
of mandatory accommodation of religious beliefs.
The easiest and most obvious example of how these exceptions might
create a claim of mandatory accommodation is the case where the law is not
generally applicable. By its design, a law may evidence that its purpose is not
defeated by excluding some members of the community from a duty of
compliance. In such cases, the courts do little violence to the law's ultimate
purpose by also excluding those whose religious beliefs would be substantially
burdened by conforming with the law's requirements.
Accommodation of religious beliefs may also be constitutionally required
when the law provides a system of individualized exemptions. Typically
government officials are given discretion in determining who must comply
with such laws. This grant of discretion evidences lawmakers' sensitivity to
the situational limits of general rules. Circumstances do matter-both as to the
desirability of requiring compliance as well as to the probability of achieving
the particular good sought by the legislation.- Officials who decline to
accommodate religious beliefs under such a system fail to recognize the unique
harm suffered by a person forced to violate his or her understanding of their
duties to God. This harm often outweighs the small contribution such person's
conformity with the law would make to the outcome the law seeks to achieve.
The third circumstance where accommodation may be constitutionally
mandatory is where a hybrid claim is presented. While the Court has yet to
develop this concept, at a minimum it would seem to encompass cases where
the burdens imposed on any one fundamental right are not sufficient to trigger
judicial intervention, but the aggregate burden is sufficient to require some
form of judicial relief. In Smith, Justice Scalia specifically mentioned the
protection afforded hybrid claims arising from combined burdens on the free
exercise of religion and freedom of speech or press, as well as burdens imposed
on associational interests.49
The final basis for invoking strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause
seems less likely to form the foundation of claims of accommodation. If laws
are motivated by religious animus, or if the effect gives rise to an inference of

49. See Smith at 1601-02.
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religious targeting, the remedy is invalidation of the law, rather than accommodation of believers.50 The Court's decision in Lukumi is an example of this.
III. RECENT FAILURES TO ACCOMMODATE
The fact that government officials have not carefully considered these
bases for claims of mandatory accommodation is evidenced in the initial
treatment of three recent matters. In Rader v. Johnston, a religiously-motivated
student requested an exemption from a university requirement that freshmen
live in university-sponsored housing. His request indicated that he wanted to
live in a Christian housing facility adjacent to the campus, where all residents
committed to live chastely and in accordance with their common religious
beliefs, forswearing the use of profanity and alcohol.5' This environment
provided a sharp contrast to university housing where condoms were readily
available in vending machines in the bathrooms, and substantial evidence
indicated that alcohol was regularly consumed.52
Although the university permitted over one-third of all freshmen students
to live off campus,53 the religiously-motivated student's application was denied.
The student sued, arguing that the university requirement that he live on
campus violated his free exercise of religion. Based upon the university's
practice of granting exemptions for a wide variety of reasons, the court held
that the requirement was not generally applicable,54 and that the school had
instituted a system of individualized exemptions.55 Therefore, the university
was required to show that denying an exemption to the student advanced a
compelling state interest. The university failed to make such a showing, and
56
the policy was declared invalid as it applied to the plaintiff.
The second example of public officials refusing to accommodate religious
beliefs is contained in a Tennessee ethics opinion. In Formal Opinion 96-F140, the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility responded to an
inquiry by a Catholic lawyer concerning the duty to accept court appointments
50. Whether all members of the Court would agree that laws should be invalidated based
only upon enactment due to religious animus, where no adverse effect is shown, is open to
question. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(questioning whether laws enacted on the basis of a desire to benefit religion should be
invalidated on the basis of motivation alone).
51. See Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-53 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding state
university could not refuse to grant exemption to freshman seeking to live off-campus in a
religious group house where such exemptions were granted to one-third of all freshmen).
52. See id. at 1545-46.
53. See idat 1547 n.14.
54. See id. at 1553.
55. See id. at 1551-53.
56. See id.
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representing young girls seeking judicial authorization to consent to abortions.
The Board opined that the lawyer's deeply held religious beliefs about the
sanctity of human life did not constitute a "compelling reason" to refuse such
appointments, leaving open the possibility that a lawyer would be disciplined
for declining." The opinion goes on to suggest that the duty of zealous
advocacy would often preclude lawyers discussing alternatives to abortion or
urging these young clients to consult with their parents.58 This opinion
represents a remarkable departure from the traditional American understanding
of the voluntary nature of the client-attorney relationship, prior Tennessee
ethics opinions and cases, and the contemporary understanding of a limited
duty to accept court appointments.59
The third example of accommodation being rejected is suggested by a
recent Alaska case. In Valley Hospital Ass "n, Inc. v. MA T-SU Coalitionfor
Choice60 the policy of a private, non-profit hospital limiting the use of its
facilities for abortions was declared unconstitutional by the Alaska Supreme
Court. 6 1 The governing board of Valley Hospital Association ("VHA") had
adopted a policy permitting abortions only when (1) one or more physicians
provided documentation that the fetus has a condition incompatible with life,
(2) the mother's life was threatened by continuing the pregnancy, or (3) the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 62 While it appears that other facilities
were available for the performance of first trimester abortions, VHA was the
only facility in the area at which a woman could have a second trimester
elective abortion. 63
In reaching its decision, the court determined that the right to privacy
contained in the Alaska constitution provided broader protection of a woman's
57. See TENN. BD. PROF'L. REsP. FORMAL Op. 96-F-140 (1996). It is important to
distinguish the bar's authority to discipline lawyers for unprofessional conduct from a court's
power to punish failure to obey valid court orders through a finding of contempt. The inquiry
addressed in Opinion 96-F-140 raises questions about the lawyer's ethical obligations, rather
than the powers of the court.
58. See id.
59. For an extended critique of this opinion, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional
Versus MoralDuty: Accepting Appointment in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
635 (1997); Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a PluralistSociety, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1469 (1998) (criticizing the Tennessee opinion as contrary to the ideal of a religiously
pluralistic society); and Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Lawyer's Moral Autonomy and Formal
Opinion 140, 33 TENN. B.J. 12, 13-14 (Jan./Feb. 1997).
60. 98 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 965.
63. See id. at 965 n.2. The court does not address the fact that state law does not require
a certificate of need in order to operate an outpatient surgical center suitable for the performance
of later abortions. Absent such a limitation, the monopoly identified by the court appears to be
a product of market forces rather than legal regulation.
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ability to obtain an abortion than presently afforded by federal law.' The court
embraced a positive right to the access to public and quasi-public institutions
for the performance of abortions, which could only be interfered with where
a compelling state interest was advanced by the least restrictive means
possible."
In examining VHA's claim that it was a private actor, the court referred
to the holding of an earlier Alaskan case finding that private hospitals may be
quasi-public institutions for purposes of observing due process rights in
credentialling decisions.66 While incorporated as a private, non-profit
corporation, ultimately the Valley court characterized VHA as a quasi-public
institution because: 1) VHA was the only hospital in the community, due, in
part, to the state's regulation of the expansion and creation of hospitals through
a certificate of need program;6 7 2) VHA received construction funds, land and
operating funds from governmental sources; 68 and 3) VHA's governing board
was elected by a public membership.69 As a quasi-public institution, VHA was
a state actor, and thus its policies concerning abortion were subject to the same
constitutional constraints imposed on a state-operated hospital.
The court rejected VHA's claim that its policy was a protected expression
of "sincere moral conviction."70 Although VHA's policy was consistent with
an Alaskan statute providing that "[n]othing in this section requires a hospital
or person to participate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable for
refusing to participate in an abortion under this section," 7 the court held the
statute "unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to VHA.,, 72 Absent a
showing that the hospital's policy on abortions furthered a compelling state
interest by the least restrictive means possible, neither the collective judgment
of the hospital's governing board nor the state statute could protect the hospital
64. See id. at 968.
65. See id. This differs significantly from even the most expansive federal interpretation
of the right to privacy, which encompasses only a negative right to be free from governmental
interference rather than a positive right to insuring the availability of abortion. See, e.g., Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
66. See Storrs v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
67. See Valley Hospital,948 P.2d at 965.

68. See id.
69. See id. at 971. "VHA is a membership organization. Any adult may become a VHA
member upon paying a five dollar application fee. Members who are residents of the Mat-Su
Borough, denominated 'general members,' annually elect the Association Board." See id. at
965.
70. See id. at 971. The hospital unsuccessfully argued that the Alaska constitution had
been interpreted to encompass freedom of conscience as well as freedom of religion.
Appellants' Brief at 44-46, Valley Hospital(No. S-7417).
71. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (Michie 1997), quoted in Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d
at 972 n.19.
72. See Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 972.
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from demands that access be granted to VHA's facilities for the performance
of abortions.
In a footnote the Court warned that this doctrine may be extended to
religiously-affiliated hospitals. "Nothing said in this opinion should be taken
to suggest that a quasi-public hospital could have a policy based on the
religious tenets of its sponsors which would be a compelling state interest.
Recognizing such a policy as 'compelling' could violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. As this point
'73 The possibilities raised by this footnote
is not raised, we do not rule on it."
illustrate the magnitude of the problem created by the Smith opinion, the
Court's subsequent rejection of RFRA in Boerne, and the continuing confusion
surrounding application of the Establishment Clause.
Several patterns emerge after considering these three matters. Each matter
involved claims by private actors that the required conduct was contrary to
their religious or sincere moral beliefs.74 Each involved demands by officials
that those beliefs be compromised for the benefit of others-the university
attempting to insure full occupancy of its residence halls,7" the abortionist
seeking to avoid building private surgical facilities,76 and the girl seeking to
obtain an abortion without her parents' consent.77 In each instance the
governing rule permitted exempting unwilling individuals or organizations
from the conduct required. Ultimately all three conflicts arose, not because of
the absence of a process or rule permitting accommodation of the beliefs, but
because the officials charged with administering those processes or enforcing
the rules refused to apply the exemptions to cases involving religiously-based
objections.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OR ACCOMMODATION?
In two of these three matters the officials rejected accommodation of
religious beliefs as violating the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Alaska Supreme Court did not elaborate on its tentative position that the
Establishment Clause could forbid exempting religiously-affiliated hospitals
from complying with the court's interpretation of the state constitution,
requiring quasi-public hospitals to provide access to their facilities for the
73. See Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 971 n. 18. William Bentley Ball provides additional
commentary on this case in The Legacy of Justice Brennan, 84 FIRST THINGS 14 (June/July
1998).
74. Arguably, lawyers and hospitals differ from students due to unique claims of public
responsibility arising from the activities they have chosen to pursue.
75. See Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
76. See Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
77. See Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-F-140 (1996).
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performance of abortions. 8 While the court acknowledged that its observation
did not constitute a "ruling" imposing legal obligations of compliance on
religiously-affiliated hospitals, the public expression of this tentative position
pressures religiously-affiliated hospitals to grant access to their facilities for the
performance of abortions contrary to the clear exemption granted by the Alaska
legislature.
A recent defense of the Tennessee ethics opinion also asserted that the
outcome was dictated by the Establishment Clause: 79
Neither the judiciary, nor the Board can carve out for Catholic
lawyers any broad ecclesiastical or denominational exception to requirements of general applicability for all lawyers, consistent with the Establishment Clause.
1. Within one critic's article, the Board is pilloried for not providing
any group exceptions to Catholic lawyers from court appointments under
the Act. Given that all Tennessee lawyers are equally susceptible to the
laws which govern citations for criminal contempt for violating a direct
court order, there is no basis for a broad religious exception for Catholic
lawyers. Just as was the case in Greene,0 no broad religious exception is
required. I believe the statutory and common law on criminal contempt as
recited earlier, DR 2-110 and applicable local rules, are all neutral laws or
regulations of general applicability, and 'an individual's religious beliefs
do not excuse him from compliance [therewith] on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee). 8
a) Granting such a group-based exception on religious grounds would
clearly violate the third prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman, and would constitute
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
b) As to one critic's myopic contention that the Board has not
properly accounted for the state of the law as to individuals who claim
conscientious objector status, Justice Frankfurter concluded in Minersville
School DistrictBoard of Ed. v. Gobitis that:

'[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general
78. See Valley Hospital,948 P.2d at 971 n. 18.
79. See Jesse D. Joseph, Update on Issues Involved in Board FormalEthics Opinion 96-F140 and Response to Criticism (The Lawyer's Moral Autonomy versus the Lawyer's
Professional Duty, Continuing Legal Education Seminar sponsored by the University of

Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, and the St. Thomas More Catholic Lawyers
Guild of West Tenn. Inc., Memphis, Tenn. (December 19, 1997)).
80. See United States v. Greene, 892 F.2d 453,456 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 495 U.S.
935 (1990)
81. Citations omitted in original.
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law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns
of a political society does not relieve the citizens from the discharge of
political responsibilities ..... ,2
2) Government must not participate in the affairs of religious
organizations, since government must be secular in its affairs. In Romer
v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, Justice Blackmun stated it
succinctly:
'Neutrality is what is required. The State must confine itself to
secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede religious activity...
a)
A court has a secular purpose under the First
Amendment--restrictions on bailiff reading Bible and evangelizing in
public areas were legitimate, and furthered the goal of upholding separation of church and state. Kelly v. Municipal Court of Marion County.
b) When government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it
conveys a message of exclusion to all who do not adhere to the favored
beliefs. Lee v. Weisman. This activity is tantamount to state establishment
of religion and is repugnant to the First Amendment. According to one of
our nation's founding fathers, and the primary author of the religion
clauses is to protect religion from governmental interference:
'Experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religions, have had a contrary
operation.' Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(1785) reprinted in 8 Papers of James Madison 301 (W. Rachal, R.
Rutland, B. Ripel & F. Teute eds. 1973). 83
This response misconstrues each prong of the Lemon test, and disregards the
substantial body of cases recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of
accommodating religious beliefs."
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the United States Supreme Court articulated a
three-prong test to determine if particular state actions violated the Establishment Clause. Constitutionally permissible laws 1) must have a secular
purpose; 2) may not result in a primary effect that either advances or inhibits
82. Although Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis was overruled by West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Disciplinary Council may be
relying upon the fact that this portion of the Gobitis decision is quoted favorably by Justice
Scalia in Smith. See Smith. 494 U.S. at 879.
83. Jesse D. Joseph, Updateon Issues Involved in Board Formal Ethics Opinion 96-F-140
and Response to Criticism, supra note 79 (citations omitted) responding to Teresa Stanton
Collett, Professional versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointment in Unjust Civil Cases, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635 (1997).

84. See, e.g,. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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religion; and 3) cannot result in an excessive entanglement between church and
state.85 While criticized at various times both by members of the Court 6 and
members of the legal academy, 8 7 the Lemon test formally remains the criteria
for evaluating Establishment claims. All elements of the Lemon test are
satisfied when applied to the Alaskan statute exempting hospitals from
participating in the performance of abortions, and the requested exemption of
Catholic lawyers from any professional duty to accept court appointment
representing young girls seeking abortions.
V. SECULAR PURPOSE
The secular purpose served by both exemptions is the removal of an
obstacle to the exercise of religious convictions. In Corporation of the
PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints v. Amos, 8
the United States Supreme Court observed, "[I]t is a permissible legislative
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. 8 9
More recently, in Smith, Justice Scalia writing for the majority recognized the
constitutional legitimacy of exemptions accommodating religious believers.'
The Alaskan statute exempting hospitals from forced participation in abortions
is exactly the sort of legislative accommodation for conscientious objectors that
the Court anticipated in Smith by its statement: "A society that believes in the

85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
86. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (Scalia, J.,
joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting) (1992); Allegheny County v. American Civil
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 429 U.S. 573, 655-657 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

87. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, The Establishment Clauseand Aid to ParochialSchools-An
Update, 75 CALrF. L. REv. 5 (1987); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It:" The
Accomodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. i; Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the
Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1984).
88. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
89. See id. at 335.
90. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citations omitted).
It is therefore not surprising that a number of states have made an exception to their
drug laws for sacramental peyote use. But to say that nondiscriminatory religiouspractice exemption [for sacramental peyote use] is permitted, or even that it is
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate
occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
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negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous
of that value in its legislation as well."9 '
Similar to the Alaska statute permitting hospitals to decline to participate
in abortions, the relevant provision of the Tennessee Code of Professional
Responsibility recognizes lawyers' right to decline court appointments when
they have compelling reasons. In considering this exemption, it is important
to note that the Tennessee Code of Professional Conduct does not contain a
disciplinary rule requiring acceptance of court appointments. This omission is
significant since only the disciplinary rules are intended to be enforceable
through professional discipline.92
In locating a duty to accept court appointments, the Tennessee Board
looked to the ethical considerations contained in the code. These considerations do not create professional duties, but instead articulate aspirations to be
pursued by lawyers. 93 Ethical Consideration 2-29 urges lawyers to accept court
appointments, but recognizes the propriety of lawyers declining courtappointed representation for "compelling reasons." 94 The Tennessee Board of
Professional Responsibility did not consider a lawyer's desire to conform her
conduct to her religious beliefs to be a compelling reason. 95
Yet under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by Smith, "... where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason." Opinion 96-F-140 identifies no compelling state interest served by
refusing to characterize the lawyer's religious objections as a "compelling
reason." Instead the Board suggests the lawyer's objection is comparable to
91. Id.
92. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1980)
("The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action."). See also Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty
to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, THE GOOD LAWYER 214, 217 (David Luban,
ed. 1983).
93. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive." TENNESSEE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement.
94. TENNESSEE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1996).
95. See Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-F-140, at 3 (1996).
Although counsel's religious and moral beliefs are clearly fervently held, EC 2-29
exhorts appointed counsel to refrain from withdrawal where the person is unable to
retain counsel, except for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons as contemplated
by this EC do not include such factors as "the repugnance of the subject matter of
the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, the belief
of the lawyer that the defendant in the criminal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of
the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case.
Id.
96. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
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that of an attorney seeking to be excused from representation because "the
defendant's cause was unpopular, or because the crime of which he was
accused was distasteful."97 Equating fulfillment of a religious duty to lack of
popularity or choices based on personal taste trivializes the lawyer's objection,
and exhibits either a lack of understanding or hostility to religious claims.98
The exemption sought by the Catholic lawyer would not only be permissible
under the Establishment Clause, but may be constitutionally required as a
matter of the Free Exercise.
VI. NEITHER ADVANCES NOR INHIBITS RELIGION
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a primary effect of the
state action be neither the advancement nor inhibition of religion. The Court
has not provided much guidance in interpreting this prong. After reviewing the
relevant cases, Professor Michael McConnell restates this part of the test: "If
the effect is to remove a significant obstacle to the exercise of a religious belief
adopted independently of the government action, the accommodation is
legitimate. By contrast, if the effect is to induce the person to adopt (or feign)
the religious belief in order to receive the benefits of the accommodation, the
government action goes beyond the range of permissible accommodation and
becomes an unlawful establishment of religion." 99 It seems unlikely that
secular private hospitals in Alaska will suddenly seek religious affiliations in
order to protect their policies limiting access to their facilities for the performance of abortions. Nor does there appear to be a realistic threat of wholesale
conversion by the Tennessee Bar to the Roman Catholic Church if Catholic
lawyers are excused from appointments representing minors seeking abortions.
The purpose of these exemptions is not to advance religion, but rather, to avoid
inhibiting it.
A strained interpretation of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,Inc. 1°° might
support an argument that granting an exemption in the Alaska and Tennessee
matters would advance the interests of religious people over those who hold no
religious beliefs. In Estate of Thornton, the United States Supreme Court
97. Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-F-140, at 3 (1996) (citing
State v. Maddux, 571 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. 1978)). Ironically, in Maddux the court reversed a
contempt citation where the lawyer asserted an inability to provide adequate representation due
to deeply-held personal beliefs. See State v. Maddux, 571 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. 1978).
98. Professor Stephen Carter has documented the trend to trivialize religious claims in his
book, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERIcAN LAW AND POLITIcs TRIVALIZE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993).

99. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 699 (1992).
100. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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invalidated a Connecticut statute giving employees an absolute right not to
work on their chosen Sabbath on the basis that the statute directly advanced
religion. By benefitting only religious employees, the state imposed undue
burdens on employers and non-religious employees who would have to
shoulder the load arising from accommodation."°1
Any analogy to Estate of Thornton is unpersuasive. Neither the Alaska
statute recognizing hospitals' right not to participate in abortions, nor the
Tennessee ethical consideration recognizing the professional right to decline
court appointments for compelling reasons, limit the benefits of exemption to
religious organizations or believers. Both are written in religiously-neutral
terms and, properly applied, would make no distinction on the basis of religion.
The religiously-based distinction under the Alaska statute arises from the
court's decision to override the statute, at least as to non-religiously-affiliated
quasi-public hospitals. 0 2 It would be a constitutionally troubling outcome if
courts can deny application of a religiously-neutral statute to secular entities,
and then use the court-created distinction to claim that the statute violates the
Establishment Clause by favoring religious interests. Neither the Alaska statute
nor the Tennessee ethical consideration at issue in these matters has a primary
effect of advancing religion.
In contrast, it is clear that, absent the exemptions contained in the Alaska
statute and the Tennessee ethical consideration, religiously-affiliated hospitals
in Alaska and Catholic lawyers in Tennessee are burdened in the exercise of
their religious beliefs. It is beyond dispute that religiously-affiliated hospitals
may have religiously-based objections to permitting the performance of
abortions in their hospitals. For example, there are four Alaskan hospitals
which are members of the Catholic Hospital Association, USA. 0 3 The
religious requirement that these hospitals adopt policies forbidding the
performance of abortions can be found in an official statement of the United
States National Conference of Catholic Bishops:
Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination of pregnancy
before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus) is
never permitted. Every procedure whose sole immediate effect is the
termination of pregnancy before viability is an abortion, which, in its moral
context, includes the interval between conception and implantation of the

embryo. Catholic health care institutions are not to provide abortion
services; even based upon the principle of material cooperation. In this

101. See id.
102. See Valley Hosp., 948 P.2d at 963.

103. The Catholic Hospital Association maintains a membership directory on the Internet.
<http://www.chausa.org/FACLDIR/FACLMAP.ASP>
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context, Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned about the
danger of scandal in any association with abortion providers.'04
The Catholic Church's position as set forth in this statement builds upon two
concepts developed in moral theology: material cooperation and scandal.
In Catholic moral discourse, "material cooperation" describes one form
of a person's involvement with another's wrongdoing.10 5 Material cooperation
with sin is conduct that contributes to another's wrongdoing, but that
wrongdoing is not the object of the cooperator's will. "Whatever is badly
willed by the wrongdoer is at most only an accepted side effect, foreseen but
not intended, of the material cooperator's act."' 6 Material cooperation with
wrongdoing is permissible if three conditions exist. First, the cooperator's
action must be good or morally indifferent. Second, the reason for the action
must be just. Finally, that reason must be proportionate to the gravity of the
other's wrongdoing, and to the
closeness of the assistance given that wrongdo07
act.'
cooperator's
the
by
ing
The Bishops' statement "Catholic health care institutions are not to
provide abortion services, even based upon the principle of material cooperation," forecloses any argument that it is theologically permissible for Catholic
hospitals to provide abortion services, so long as these institutions do not
affirmatively initiate women's use of such services. Nor does the Bishops'
statement permit hospital administrators to argue, as the district court in Alaska
seemingly did, that providing facilities
to doctors who perform abortions is not
08
abortions.
in
participating
directly
The second theological concept that the Bishops refer to is scandal. The
duty to avoid giving scandal requires Catholics abstain from acts that
104. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES
FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES, para. 45 (1994).
105. See id. See also, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Ethical and
Religious DirectivesforCatholic Health Care Services (1994).

106. Id. at 873. "Cooperation is material [as opposed to formal] when it avoids participation
in the evil intention of the sinner. The material cooperator does not want the sinful action to
take place, and there is ambiguity about what he actually does. His assistance may in fact
contribute to the sin, but it is not of its nature or in the circumstances exclusively ordained to
the commission of the sin." F.E. Klueg, Sin, Cooperation, in 13 NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 246 (1967).

See also Richard P. McBrien, THE HARPER COLLINS

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLICISM

366-7 (1995).

107. See GERMAIN GRISEz, Difficult Moral Questions, in THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS
app. 2 at 876 (1997) (quoting and discussing St. Alphonsus Liquori, Theologia moralis (L.
Gaude', ed.)).
108. See Valley Hospital,948 P.2d at 966 ("The superior court noted that nothing in the
permanent injunction required anyone affiliated with the hospital 'to participate directly in the
performance of any abortion procedure if that person, for reasons of conscience or belief,

objects to doing so."').
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encourage others to sin.' 9 The Bishops write, "Catholic health care institutions
need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in any association with
abortion providers." By this, they remind health care providers that others
often look to the conduct of Catholic institutions to determine the true
commitments of the Church. "° Association with abortion providers through
allowing them the use of Catholic hospital facilities can reasonably be seen as
a repudiation of the Church's teaching that abortion is objectively wrong. To
legally require Catholic hospitals to allow abortions to be performed on their
premises is for the government to require conduct directly contrary to the
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
Similarly, insistence by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility that Catholic lawyers shirk their professional obligations when they seek to
avoid appointments representing young girls seeking abortions is to burden
Catholic lawyers in the exercise of their religious beliefs. Since the first
century, the Roman Catholic Church has taught that procured abortion is an
evil."' "Procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever
means it is carriedout, of a human being in the initialphase of his or her
existence, extendingfrom conception to birth."' 2 Simply refusing to obtain or
perform an abortion is not sufficient for the conscientious member of the
Church. The duty to avoid evil prohibits both personal performance of evil
acts and intentional cooperation with such acts." 3 Therefore the Church
109. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, § 2284-87.

Scandal is an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil. The person who
gives scandal becomes his neighbor's tempter. He damages virtue and integrity; he
may even draw his brother into spiritual death. Scandal is a grave offense if by deed
or omission another is deliberately led into a grave offense.
Scandal takes on a particular gravity by reason of the authority of those who
cause it or the weakness of those who are scandalized ....
Id.
110. "Sometimes the fact that 'good' people are involved makes wrongdoing seem not so
wrong and provides material for rationalization and self-deception by people tempted to
undertake the same sort of wrong. Perhaps more often the material cooperation of 'good'
people leads others to cooperate formally or wrongly, even if only materially." GERMAIN
GRSEZ, Difficult Moral Questions, in THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS app. 2 at 881 (1997).

Ill. John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION, LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1970). See also CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH, § 2271; POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE (Evangelium Vitae) at
para. 61 (1995) ("Throughout Christianity's two thousand year history, this same doctrine has
been constantly taught by the Fathers of the Church and by her Pastors and Doctors"); and
Gerald Bonner, Abortion and Early Christian Thought, in LIFE AND LEARNING IV:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE (Joseph W.

Koterski, S.J. ed. 1995).
112. POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE (Evangelium Vitae) at para. 58 (1995)
(emphasis in the original).
113. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, § 1868, describes this prohibition:
Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by
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teaches that a Catholic cannot "take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of
such a law [legalizing procured abortions], or vote for it. Moreover, he may
not collaborate in its application."" 4
Representing a girl seeking judicial authority to obtain an abortion would
be collaboration in the application of the positive law permitting procured
abortion. This is true, notwithstanding the legal profession's statement that a
"lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment,
does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social
or moral views or activities. "" By accepting the court appointment in judicial
bypass proceedings, the lawyer would be agreeing to publicly defend the act
of abortion, and to make that act possible through obtaining a court order
authorizing the girl to consent to the procedure. This is not permissible under
6
Church teachings. 1
The Board's interpretation of the Tennessee Code of Professional
Responsibility makes the Catholic lawyer choose between obeying God or the
state. This is forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
and inconsistent with the Tennessee Code of Professional Responsibility. The
disciplinary rules do not require acceptance of court appointments. The ethical
considerations urging lawyers to do so recognize the legitimacy of lawyers
declining appointments where compelling reasons exist." 7 The refusal of the
Board to recognize the deeply-held religious beliefs of the inquiring lawyer and
accept those beliefs as a "compelling reason" to decline the appointment,
unconstitutionally burdens the lawyer's ability to act in accordance with his
religious beliefs.
others when we cooperate in them:
-- by participating directly and voluntarily in them;
-by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them;
-by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do
so;
-by protecting evil doers.
For an extended discussion of the application of this doctrine to the practice of law, see Robert
J. Muise, Note, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of
Conscience,71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 771 (1996); Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek
No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection and Cooperation With Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339
(1998).
114.

SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON

PROCURED ABORTION para. 22 (1974).

For an extended discussion of the problem of
cooperation with the evil of abortion, see John J. Conley, S.J., Problems of Cooperationin an
Abortive Culture, in LIFE AND LEARNING VI: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY
FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 103 (Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. ed. 1997).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983).
116. See John J. Conley, S.J., Problems of Cooperationin an Abortive Culture, in LIFE AND
LEARNING VI: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 103
(Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. ed., 1997).
117. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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Exempting religiously-affiliated hospitals and religiously-motivated
lawyers will not advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, but
denying the protection of the exemptions adopted by the Alaskan Legislature
and the Tennessee Bar will certainly inhibit religious practice.
VII. No EXCESsIvE ENTANGLEMENT

The third and final prong of the Lemon test requires that the state action
not result in excessive entanglement between church and state."' Disciplinary
Counsel for the Tennessee Board has stated that accommodating Catholic
lawyers' religious obligation to decline court appointments representing minors
seeking abortions will "clearly violate" this prong, yet there is no authority for
this unique application of the doctrine." 9 Cases where the courts have found
excessive entanglement commonly involve either the delegation of government
decisionmaking to a religious body, 2 ° or the need for constant interaction
between church and state in order to monitor some state-funded activity
administered by the church.' Neither of these is present in the Tennessee or
Alaska matters. Excusing Catholic lawyers from serving as attorneys for girls
seeking abortions is not an improper delegation of state authority, nor does it
require any continuing supervision of the lawyer by the state. Recognizing the
statutory right of hospitals to decline to participate in abortions is exactly
that-recognition of a right. Once the judgment is made to honor the decision
of the religious individual or organization, there is nothing left for the state to
do.

118. Professor Laurence Tribe identifies five Establishment Clause doctrines involving
entanglement:
Entanglement forms the basis of five first amendment doctrines: (1) In
challenges to government action under the establishment clause, the action is
unconstitutional if it creates excessive administrative entanglement between church
and state. (2) Under the establishment clause, the action is also unconstitutional if
it turns over traditionally governmental powers to religious institutions. (3) In
establishment clause challenges, the challenged action is subjected to stricter
scrutiny if it breeds religiously based political divisiveness. (4) In seeking a
religiously based exemption from a law or regulation, a party may be able to prevail
under the establishment clause by showing that enforcement would create excessive
administrative entanglement. (5) Courts and other agencies of government may not
inquire into pervasively religious issues.
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW 1226 (2d ed. 1998).

119. See Joseph, Update on Issues, supra n. 79.
120. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding city could not
permit churches to veto issuance of liquor licenses).
121. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding state's extensive monitoring of
remedial educational programs in religiously-affiliated schools violated First Amendment).
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On the other hand, refusing to recognize the lawyer's or hospital's right
to decline involvement in abortion may result in substantial entanglement of
church and state. This is most clearly evidenced by the unique direction given
by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility concerning the content
of communications between client and lawyer. It would be unnecessary for the
Board to address whether the lawyer might suggest alternatives to abortion or
urge the young client to consult her parents, but for the decision that Catholic
lawyers should not seek to decline appointments in these cases. Regardless of
the lawyer's beliefs concerning the morality of abortion, a lawyer might
reasonably question a young client's decision about the continuation of her
pregnancy, or her decision to "go it alone" by refusing to consult her parents."2
The Tennessee Board's claim that the duty of zealous representation may
require the Catholic lawyer to remain silent about these issues is contrary to
good sense, good lawyering, and good ethics. To follow such direction in any
other context, would be grounds for professional discipline and claims of legal
malpractice should the client suffer injuries that could have been avoided if the
lawyer had expressed her concerns.lu More relevant for purposes of
Establishment Clause analysis, any attempts by the Board to enforce such
silence would necessarily involve a sort of second guessing of professional
judgments by Catholic lawyers on the basis that those judgments might be
theologically based. This examination of a lawyer's judgment for hints
of
24
ecclesiastical influence is unnecessary, unseemly, and unconstitutional. 1
122. "Teenagers who do not tell their parents about their abortion have an increased
incidence of emotional problems and feelings of guilt." Jo Ann Rosenfeld, Emotional
Responses to TherapeuticAbortion, 45 AM. FAM. PHYsIcIAN 137 (1992). Additional sources
are collected and discussed in Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for PostAbortion Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 639 (1996).
123. See Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634 (S.C. 1991) (holding that malpractice claim
could be asserted where lawyer knew client was relying upon inaccurate information and did
nothing to prevent it); and Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1303 (N.J. 1992) ("[T]he
lawyer is obligated to keep the client informed of the status of the matter for which the lawyer
has been retained, and is required to advise the client on the various legal and strategic issues
that arise"). See also RESTATEMENT THIRD OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 151 cmt. h
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1995).
A lawyer's advice to a client may properly include the lawyer's views
concerning aspects of a proposed course of conduct that are not
narrowly legal in nature. The lawyer's advice on significant non-legal
aspects of a matter may be particularly appropriate when the client
reasonably appears to be unaware of such considerations or their
importance or when it should be apparent that the client expects more
than narrow legal counsel. A lawyer is required to provide such
assistance when necessary in the exercise of care to the extent stated
in § 74.
Id.
124. The fourth type of entanglement could be called "regulatory entanglement." Its list

1998]

FREE EXERCISE

The Alaska Supreme Court's tentative position that religiously-affiliated
hospitals must allow abortions to be performed in their facilities suggests even
greater entanglement between church and state. It does not require much
imagination to envision Sister Mary Margaret and Father Gonzales being
carried away from the doors of the surgical suite by the local sheriff because
they refuse to grant admission for the performance of an abortion.125
The Alaskan district court naively suggests that ordering hospitals to allow
abortions to occur on their premises will not require any unwilling person to
directly participate in the performance of an abortion. Depending upon the
definition of "direct participation," this could be true. If direct participation is
limited to only the abortionist who actually performs the procedure and the
expectant mother who is his patient, there will be no unwilling participants.
Yet doctors engaged in surgical procedures are rarely "one-man" shows.
Nurses typically assist in any surgeries sufficiently complex to require they be
performed in hospitals. 26 Post-operative monitoring and care are rarely done
only by doctors. Insuring that hospitals comply with the access right created
by the Alaskan court will require careful oversight of religiously-affiliated
hospitals by government officials. It is unlikely that enforcement of this unique
Alaskan right can result in anything but the sort of excessive entanglement of
church and state that the Constitution's religion clauses were intended to
27
prevent.1

of entangling relationships is identical to the list under administrative entanglement arising in
suits to strike down government benefits to religion; regulatory entanglement arises in suits to
create religiously based exemptions to government burdens. Potentially, the regulatory
entanglement doctrine permits religious bodies to use the Establishment Clause, like the Free
Exercise Clause, as a shield from government intrusion. Although the Supreme Court has not
yet based any holding on regulatory entanglement, it has implicitly recognized the doctrine.
And several lower courts have carved out regulatory entanglement exemptions for religious
organizations, especially in employment laws. See TRIBE, supra 118, at 1230.
125. See U.S. v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Court declined to sentence
elderly bishop to jail for silently praying rosary outside of abortion clinic in violation of Free
Access to Clinics Enforcement Act).
126. In a letter dated October 20, 1990, related to the hospital's policy limited abortions,
the physician-plaintiff in Valley Hospital complained of the lack of nursing assistance. "For
the last year and one half, I have met with continual frustration in attempting to perform
abortions [at Valley Hospital]. The reason I was given was that there was no staff member
willing to participate in second trimester abortions, and only one staff person willing to
participateinfirst trimester abortions." Brief for Appellants at 7, Valley Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v.
MAT-SU Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997) (No. S-7417).
127. See supra note 82.
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VIII. RECOGNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATIONS

Many laws and rules in American society contain sufficient latitude for
most religious believers to conduct themselves in accordance with their
consciences and their understanding of their duties to God. The university
policy in Rader allowing students to seek exemptions from a universityhousing requirement, the Alaskan statute exempting hospitals from
participating in abortions, and the Tennessee ethical consideration recognizing
the propriety of lawyers declining court appointments for compelling reasons
are examples of this latitude. Yet university officials and members of the
Alaska Supreme Court and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility
refused to extend the protection inherent in these systems of individualized
exemptions to religious believers. The Alaskan court and the Tennessee Board
declared themselves unwilling to apply these necessary exemptions because of
fear that such accommodations would violate the Establishment Clause. As
illustrated by the preceding analysis of these two matters, these fears are
unwarranted, yet such concerns are pervasive among government officials.
Justice Scalia's continuing reliance upon the political process to provide
appropriate exemptions for religious believers is only realistic if and when the
Court makes clear to all government officials that accommodating religious
beliefs is not only desirable and permissible in many instances, but constitutionally required on occasion. Striking down RFRA on the basis that it violates
Congressional powers may have been the proper interpretation of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 Permitting religiously-neutral generally
applicable laws to stand absent violations of multiple constitutional rights, or
refusal to extend a system of particularized exemptions, may simplify Free
Exercise jurisprudence while leaving sufficient room for political, if not
judicial, protection of religious beliefs. But in the absence of clear precedent
authorizing, and in some cases, mandating accommodation of religious beliefs,
the political negotiations concerning such accommodations will continue to be
conducted in the ominous shadow of the Establishment Clause. This shadow
invariably will bias government officials toward no accommodation. The Court
rejected the opportunity in Boerne to illuminate the law of Free Exercise. It
can only be hoped that it will not forego the next opportunity as well. For the
present, evidence continues to mount that the new rules of political engagement over religious liberty are "heads, secularists win; tails, believers lose."
And, in the end, all Americans will all be the poorer for the toss.
128. 1remain somewhat uncertain on this point, although I find persuasive the arguments
made by Professor McConnell in Institutions and Interpretation: A Critiqueof City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1997).

